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Abstract
Both market (e.g. auctions) and non-market mechanisms (e.g. lotteries and prior-
ity lists) are used to allocate a large amount of scarce public resources that produce
large private benets and small consumption externalities. I study a model in which
the use of both market and non-market mechanisms can be rationalized. Agents
are risk neutral and heterogeneous in terms of their monetary value for a good and
their opportunity cost of money, which are both private information. The designer
wants to allocate a set of identical goods to the agents with the highest values. To
achieve her goal, she can screen agents on the basis of their observable characteris-
tics, and on the basis of information on their willingness to pay that she can extract
using market mechanisms. In contrast to models where willingness to pay and value
coincide, a rst best cannot be achieved. My main result is that both market and
non-market mechanisms, or hybrid mechanisms, can be optimal depending on the
prior information available to the designer. In particular, non-market mechanisms
may be optimal if the value is positively correlated with the opportunity cost of
money.
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11 Introduction
Governments play a key role in the initial allocation of property rights for a large number
of scarce public resources that produce large private benets and small consumption
externalities. Examples include, but are not limited to, the assignment of broadcasting
licences, oil drilling rights, access to education, draft exemption in war time, subsidized
housing, and scarce medical resources. The allocation methods used to distribute these
types of public resources can be classied into two broad groups: market mechanisms
(e.g. auctions or posted prices), where the nal allocation is based upon the claimants'
willingness to pay for the good; and non-market mechanisms (e.g. lotteries and priority
lists) that do not exploit information on the willingness to pay. The main aim of this
paper is to provide a framework in which the existence of both groups of mechanisms can
be rationalized and the two systems compared.1
Although there are several papers that study market and non market mechanisms
independently, few eorts have been devoted to explaining the operation of both types
of mechanisms in the same economic environment.2 In particular, the study of market
mechanisms dominates the literature, and the papers that consider non-market mecha-
nisms motivate this restriction exogenously, outside the model. This is attributable to the
fact that in a model where utility is perfectly transferable through monetary exchange,
assignment of a set of private goods to those consumers with the highest willingness to
pay is the only Pareto ecient outcome.3 Therefore, if the designer maximizes welfare,
and the agents are not budget constrained, there is no room for non-market mechanisms.4
1Hybrid systems combining market and non market mechanisms are also possible and are considered
in the analysis (see e.g. Evans, Vossler and Flores (2009)).
2For our purposes, the analysis of market mechanisms under incomplete information can be summa-
rized as auction theory (see e.g. Milgrom (2004), Klemperer (2004) or Krishna (2002)). The main branch
of the literature that examines non-market mechanisms is the literature on two sided matching, based
on Gale and Shapley's (1962)original study (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a textbook treatment).
The papers that compare market and non-market mechanisms are discussed in the section on related
literature.
3Otherwise a mutually benecial possibility for trade would exist between the recipient of the good
and someone with a higher willingness to pay. Note that distributional objectives can be achieved by
distributing the proceedings from a market mechanism rather than by implementing a dierent type of
allocation.
4The traditional rationale for interfering with markets, that is externalities, is not applicable to the
case of private goods (for a classical discussion see Pigou (1932), pp.115-116). For why non-market
2In order to provide a framework where both market and non market mechanisms can
be compared, I assume that individuals are heterogeneous in terms of both, the value that
they can enjoy by obtaining one good (e.g. return from education in the case of a school
admissions process), and the opportunity cost of money that they face, which for simplicity
can be thought of as the interest rate payable in an imperfect capital market. Further,
I assume that the designer allocates the goods in order to maximize, not the welfare of
agents, which would require implementing a Pareto ecient outcome, but rather total
value.5 Finally, I maintain that the information held by agents is not available to the
designer, which can only control the allocation of the goods and asks for payments.
The main contribution of this paper is to investigate the above mechanism design
problem. A non-standard problem arises because willingness to pay, which is the poten-
tially observable information, is only a noisy signal of value, which is the piece of private
information which the designer is interested in acquiring. The main insight that emerges
from this study is that the use of non-market mechanisms may be optimal when informa-
tional asymmetries impede the extraction of information on value that is facilitated by
the acquisition of information on the willingness to pay.
In the example of the schools admission process, the argument would be as follows.
Assume that the returns from education for a given individual are determined by some
set of observable characteristics and by some unobservable characteristics (e.g. individual
motivation). Furthermore, suppose that individuals are all the same in terms of their
observable characteristics.6 If, on average, students with lower levels of motivation display
a higher willingness to pay, an admission committee would prefer, ceteris paribus, to assign
places to those that show the lowest willingness to pay. However, because this latter
information is private, the designer will not be able to implement such an allocation.7
Therefore collecting information on the willingness to pay is not useful, and a lottery or
a priority list based on observable characteristics, is preferable. The 
ip side to this is
that if, on average, agents with higher values display a higher willingness to pay, then it
is optimal to adopt a standard market mechanism (or a hybrid mechanism).
mechanisms can be useful to implement a Pareto ecient allocation if agents are budget constrained see
Che and Gale (2007).
5Equality of treatment as a motivation for non-market mechanisms can be seen as an extreme case
of this idea: the designer maximizes welfare under the constraint that every individual receives equal
treatment (see Young (1994), p.20).
6Note that my analysis will allow for heterogeneity among agents.
7This is so because the desired allocation is not monotone increasing in the willingness to pay.
3A practical implication of my analysis is that, in general, when the objective of the
designer is not welfare maximization, a case by case evaluation is needed to establish
whether a market or a non-market mechanism is optimal in a given environment. As an-
other possible application of my results consider the problem of allocating scarce medical
resources. The medical profession appears to be strongly against the idea of assigning
scarce medical resources to the highest bidder.8 Instead, dierent criteria are used to
select among applicants for the same scarce medical resource. For example, saving the
highest number of lives is a classic and long-standing rationing principle.9 This implies
also that scarce life-saving medical resources should be assigned to patients with the high-
est chances of survival from receiving the resource.10 My analysis suggests that, in some
cases, using information on the willingness to pay might be benecial, even if the goal
set for allocation is saving the highest number of lives. The empirical question in this
case is: do we expect that people with a higher willingness to pay will be likely to benet
more from a given resource? If the answer to the question is positive, but policy makers
insist on refusing to consider the willingness to pay as a possible allocation method, then
a rethinking of the main goal of the allocation would seem necessary.
There are three other studies that appear closely related to the present one: Che
and Gale (2007), Esteban and Ray (2006) and Fernandez and Gali (1999). Che and
Gale (2007) compare market and non-market allocation methods for the ecient initial
assignment of ownership, to a set of wealth constrained agents. In their model, if a good
is sold at its market clearing price, it might not be acquired by the individual with the
highest willingness to pay for it. In fact, it might be acquired by a wealthy individual
with a lower willingness to pay, rather than by someone that would be willing to pay
8E.g., in a recent paper surveying methods of allocation for scarce medical interventions, Persad,
Wertheimer, and Emanuel (2009) state: \we do not regard ability to pay as a plausible option for the
scarce life-saving interventions we discuss". Resistance to the introduction of monetary markets for organs
for transplant is also documented in Becker and Elias (2007) and in Roth (2007). A discussion of the
reasons behind these ethical judgments are beyond the scope of this paper.
9This principle is the motivation for policies related to the allocation of in
uenza vaccine (see Emanuel
and Wertheimer (2006)) and responses to bioterrorism (see Phillips (2006)).
10My model would apply for example to the case where a limited number of vaccines is available, for
a non easily transmissible disease that could be fatal if contracted. All the assumptions in my model are
satised: (i) increasing the probability of surviving a disease is a private good; (ii) the eectiveness of a
vaccine may depend on some private information held by the patient (e.g. sexual, or alcohol consumption
behaviour); and (iii) people may have dierent opportunity costs for money.
4more, but is unable to do so. Therefore, a lottery outperforms a market based allocation,
if the recipient of the good is allowed to resell. In contrast with my model, in Che and
Gale's setting the ultimate goal of the designer remains that of allocating the goods to
the agents with the highest willingness to pay.
Esteban and Ray (2006) analyse how wealth inequality may distort the allocation
of public resources. In their model a government seeks to allocate limited resources to
productive sectors. However both sectoral productivity and wealth are privately known.
The government, even if it seeks to assign the resources to the most productive sectors,
may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability
create loud lobbying. While this argument is strongly related to my main insight, they
work within a very specic lobbying game and do not address the underlying mechanism
design problem. Moreover, they assume that wealth and productivity are uncorrelated
variables, which in my general analysis is treated as a special case.
Fernandez and Gali (1999) compare the performance of markets and tournaments (i.e.
non-market mechanisms where agents engage in costly signalling activity) as allocation
mechanisms in an economy with borrowing constraints. They study a model where a
continuum of individuals, with dierent skills and dierent access to capital markets, is
matched to a continuum of inputs with dierent productivity (following Becker (1973)).
While tournaments induce a costly eort, which ultimately is wasted, they might provide
a better match between skilled individuals and inputs. Therefore, tournaments might be
preferred to market mechanisms (where the best inputs go to those that can pay the most
for them), if their signalling ability is substantial. While, again, the insight is related to
mine, Fernandez and Gali's analysis is quite dierent. In particular, they consider dierent
types of non-market mechanisms, where signalling is performed via a costly eort.11
The paper is organized as follows: the following section discussing the model, section
4 presents the main results and section 5 concludes the paper.
11Finally, my paper is also related to the literature on auctions and mechanism design with nancial
constraints. The most closely related papers are probably Che and Gale (2000) and (1998). The study in
the rst paper examines revenue maximizing mechanisms in a one seller/one buyer model. My treatment
of nancial constraints is less general . However, their results do not easily generalize to a multi-agent
setting. In the second paper they study standard auctions focusing on a model where agents are budget
constrained. In both of these papers, the performance of market allocation mechanisms is evaluated in
terms of revenue and welfare maximization, while my analysis focuses on a mechanism designer with
other objectives.
52 The model
Environment. A risk neutral designer has k  1 units of an indivisible good to allocate,
which she values at zero. There are n > k risk neutral agents, who have unitary demand
and private monetary valuation for the goods. The valuation is the amount of money
that an agent would be willing to pay if he could borrow at zero interest rate.12 Valuation
diers from the willingness to pay because agents are heterogeneous in terms also of the
opportunity cost of making their payments (e.g. the interest rate in an imperfect capital
market). If an agent with value vi  0, is faced with a private interest rate of ri  0, and
obtains a good with probability 0  pi  1 and pays an amount of money mi, his vN-M
utility is ui(pi;mi;vi;ri) = vipi (1+ri)mi. The type of an agent is a pair (vi;ri).13 Types
are independently distributed across agents, according to commonly known distributions
Fvi;ri(;) with i = 1;:::;n. For each i, I assume that the density fvi;ri is strictly positive
in some convex Xi  <2
+, and zero elsewhere.
I assume explicitly that, in trying to implement her objectives, the designer can control
only the allocation of the goods and require payments. Furthermore, I assume that all
observable information about values and opportunity costs is incorporated in the prior
distribution. Finally, I assume that the designer is not able to perform any test that
would reveal information about the valuation or the interest rate, other than that already
contained in the observable characteristics of the agent.
Characterization of the type space. Suppose that agents are required to choose
within a possibility set, in which each element is a pair (p;m) (i.e. each element of
the possibility set is a couple formed by a probability of obtaining the good and the
monetary transfer). The observable behaviour of two bidders of types (v;r) and (v0;r0),
such that v
1+r = v0
1+r0, is indistinguishable. Their utility functions are the same up to a
scale-normalization and, therefore, they represent the same preferences.14
12E.g., in the case of a scarce medical resource, the idea would be that, net of the heterogeneous
opportunity cost of money, dierent monetary evaluations would re
ect the dierent benets from using
the resource, that the dierent agents might expect.
13The restriction that 0  pi  1 is harmless because agents have unitary demand.
14To see the point, assume that type (v;r) weakly prefers allocation (p;m) to allocation (p0;m0), while
type (v0;r0) weakly prefers p0;m0 over (p;m). For this to be the case we must have: pv   (1 + r)m 
vp0 (1+r)m0 and p0v0 (1+r0)m0  v0p (1+r0)m. Next, divide the rst inequality by (1+r) and the
second by (1+r0). It is easy to verify that, whenever v
1+r = v
0
1+r0, both types must be exactly indierent
between the two allocations, that is, pv (1+r)m = vp0 (1+r)m0 and p0v0 (1+r0)m0 = v0p (1+r0)m.
6Let us denote the willingness to pay of an agent i by wi =
vi
(1+ri). In other words, wi
is the maximum amount of money that i would be willing to spend in order to obtain the
good, given that the value is vi and he faces an interest rate of ri. For all i, wi has a well
dened prior distribution Fwi (hereafter denoted Zi), supported in Wi = (wi;wi), where
wi = inf(vi;ri)2Xi
vi








(1 + x)fvi;ri(y(1 + x);x)dx

dy
It is a consequence of the independence across i of vectors (vi;ri), that the willingness
to pay is distributed independently across agents. If one sees the type space as a Cartesian
plane where the coordinates are vi and 1+ri, then all types with the same willingness to
pay wi will lie along the same straight line from the origin. Figure 2 is an illustration of
this fact.
Mechanism design. We perform a standard static mechanism design exercise in
which the designer wants to implement an outcome that maximizes her objective func-
tion (see next section for details). Consistent with the empirical evidence, I assume that
the designer (i.e. a government or some other institution) can ban resale.16 The revela-
tion principle states that, for any possible mechanism that can be designed, there exists
an incentive compatible direct mechanism that achieves the same equilibrium outcome.
Therefore, in the search for an optimal mechanism (e.g. welfare or revenue maximizing),
the designer can restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms in which each agent
has an incentive to report his private information truthfully to the designer.
The alignment of preferences for types with same willingness to pay greatly simplies
the mechanism design problem. In fact, in this setting there is no hope of obtaining full
revelation of both values and interest rates, unless everyone with the same willingness to
pay obtains the same outcome (p;m).17 Therefore, I can restrict attention, without loss
of generality, to incentive compatible direct mechanisms that assign the same pair (p;m)
15The distributions Zi() are dened in intervals because Xi is a convex subset of <2
+. For simplicity,
the interval is left open.
16In this setting it can never be in the interests of the designer to allow resale. This assumption is
not innocuous, unless in the allocation that the designer wants to implement the agents with the highest
willingness to pay obtain the goods (see Zheng (2002))
17Several studies examine settings with multidimensional signal spaces and lower dimensional policy
spaces. See, e.g., McAfee and McMillan (1988), Armstrong (1996), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and,
more recently, Deneckere and Severinov (2009).
7Figure 1: Typical Type Space
to bidders with the same willingness to pay.18
Thus, the content of the remainder of this section is standard. Let w = w1;:::;wn,
let W = W1  ::: Wn, and nally let w i indicate the vector of the n   1 willingness to
pay other than that of player i. The direct mechanism hp;mi species the probability
for each agent to obtain the object, p1(w);:::;pn(w) 2 [0;1]n and the payment that is





i;v i;r i) for any (vi;ri) and (v0
i;r0
i) such that v(1 + r0) = v0(1 + r).
While incentive compatibility requires only that types with the same willingness to pay obtain the same
utility, there is no loss of generality in looking at mechanisms where the allocation and the payment rules
coincide for such types.
8required m1(w);:::;mn(w) 2 IR
n as a function of the prole of reported willingness to
pay. A mechanism is feasible if and only if:
n X
i=1
pi(w)  k 8w 2 W (1)




mi(w)  0 8w 2 W (2)
The expected utility for agent i from reporting w0
i in hp;mi when there is a true






i;w i)]. For a mechanism to be incentive compatible, bidders
must have an incentive to report their information truthfully, if the other bidders are






Finally, I assume that agents can opt out of the mechanism and obtain zero utility
before reporting any information to the designer. That is, participation constraints require




i (wi;wi)  0 (4)
To conclude this section, I can state without proof two well known results from the the-
ory of mechanism design. The rst Lemma simplies the designer's problem by showing
that an allocation rule can be implemented if and only if Ew i[pi(wi;w i)] is increasing.
The second Lemma states that restricting attention to ex-post incentive compatible mech-
anisms that satisfy an ex-post participation constraint, comes without loss of generality.
Lemma 1. Let Pi(wi) = Ew i[pi(wi;w i)] and Mi(wi) = Ew i[mi(wi;w i)] (we call
these, the reduced form allocation and payment schedules). A direct mechanism hp;mi is
incentive compatible, satises participation constraints and does not run a decit if and
only if:
8w;w
0 : w  w
0 Pi(w)  Pi(w
0) (5)




9Lemma 2. Take any feasible (1) and incentive compatible (3) mechanism that satises
participation (4) and no decit (2) constraints. There is a feasible mechanism that satises
the no-decit constraint, has the same allocation rule and generates the same reduced
form payment schedule, satises ex-post participation constraints and is ex-post incentive
compatible.19
3 Results
The designer maximizes the following objective function under incentive compatibility,
















Call rst best the mechanism whose outcome maximizes the above function without
incentive constraints. A rst best mechanism, which serves as a benchmark for the analysis
of the problem under incomplete information, allocates the goods to the k agents with the
highest values. Clearly, if the designer knows the values of the agents, implementation of
a rst best outcome is trivial.
Next, I consider the case where the designer knows the prevailing interest rates, but
not the values. It is not dicult to see that the rst best is attainable in this case. In
fact, for any given willingness to pay wi and known interest rate ri, there is a unique
value vi = (1 + ri)wi. Moreover, vi increases with the willingness to pay wi. Therefore,
building on the fact that, according to Lemma 1, every monotonic increasing allocation is
implementable, it is possible to construct a mechanism to achieve the desired outcome. I
have the following proposition (see appendix A for a formal statement, and for the proof).
Proposition 1. Assume that the designer knows the interest rates. A mechanism hp;mi
that allocates the goods to the agents with the highest values, breaking ties using fair lot-
teries, and determines payments according to (6) is feasible, incentive compatible, satises
participation constraints and generates no-decit.
19More formally, let hp;mi be a mechanism that satises (1)-(4). There exists hp0;m0i such that p0 =
p, and for all i,wi, w0
i and w i we have U
hp;mi
i (wi;wi) = Uhp
0;m
0i
i (wi;wi), pi(wi;w i)wi mi(wi;w i) 
0 and pi(wi;w i)wi   mi(wi;w i)  pi(w0
i;w i)wi   mi(w0
i;w i)
10This is rather a special case. In general, the presence of uncertainty about the oppor-
tunity cost of money impairs the ability of the designer to achieve an optimal outcome.
As shown in the next proposition, if there is uncertainty, conditional on knowing the
willingness of the agents to pay, as to which agent has the highest value, then a rst best
cannot be attained.20 The proof is straightforward and shows that full knowledge of the
interest rates is (almost always) necessary to achieve a rst best.
Proposition 2. If there is a player i with (vi;ri) and (v0
i;r0







and a player j with (vj;rj) in Xj such that vi > vj > v0
i, and there are less than k players
such that for each player s within them vs > vi for each (vs;rs) in Xs, a rst best cannot
be achieved.
Proof. The last condition ensures that no set of players exists to which the designer would
want to assign the good for sure, when player i is around. When no such set of players
exists, sometimes the designer will want to assign a good to player i. However, she cannot
discriminate between types (vi;ri) and (v0
i;r0
i) of player i. The fact that a player j exists
such that the designer might prefer j over i whenever i is of type (vi;ri), implies that a
rst best cannot be achieved. In fact, in any case, either assigning the good to i or to
j there is a positive probability that the allocation is not optimal. Figure 3 depicts this
situation.
As rst best is not attainable under incomplete information, we are interested in con-









The maximization is subject to feasibility, incentive compatibility, participation and
no-decit constraints. Because the objective function is linear in the allocation rule, I
can characterize a solution to this problem using Myerson's ironing technique. The next
proposition achieves this. The formal statement and proof are presented in appendix C.




E[vi j wi = Z
 1
i (y)]dy Gi(x) = convhHi(x)i gi(x) = G
0
i(x)
20This must be contrasted with the standard private value case where the designer maximizes welfare.
In that case, a rst best outcome can be achieved by means of a Vickrey auction (see Vicrey (1961)).
21Appendix B shows how this objective function is formally obtained.
11Figure 2: Impossibility of Achieving a First Best
Here, convhi denotes the convex hull of the function and Z
 1
i indicates the inverse func-
tion of Zi.22 Where the derivative of Gi(v) is not dened, we extend it using the right or
left derivative. Dene the priority function i for agent i as:
i(wi) = gi(Zi(wi))
In an optimal mechanism, the k agents with a willingness to pay that achieves the
highest priority level, obtain the goods and ties are broken by a lottery. The payment for
22Gi(x) is the highest convex function in [0,1] such that Gi(x)  Hi(x) 8x. The fact that Xi is a
convex set ensures that Zi is strictly increasing (when it is dierent from 0 or 1) and therefore invertible.
12an agent who obtains a good is equal to the minimum willingness to pay that would have
allowed the agent to obtain the good, given the mechanism in place:




To make the solution more intelligible, observe that if E[vijwi] is increasing in wi then
i(wi) = E[vijwi] (because G  H). Instead, if E[vijwi] is decreasing, then i(wi) = E[vi]
(because H(x) is a straight line going from 0 to E[vi], when x goes from 0 to 1). Some
further explanation is required.
Remark 1. If E[vijwi] is non-decreasing for all i, then a mechanism that allocates goods
to the bidders reporting the highest conditional expected values, is an optimal mechanism.
Therefore, information on the willingness to pay is extracted and payments are requested
from agents.
Remark 2. When agents are ex-ante symmetric and E[vijwi] is non-decreasing any stan-
dard auction without a reserve price (which allocates goods to the agents with the highest
willingness to pay) is an optimal mechanism. An important consequence of this fact is
that the objectives of Pareto eciency (within the coalition formed by all agents) and
value maximization are not in contrast. Therefore, the designer need not prohibit resale
of the goods.23
Remark 3. If E[vijwi] is a non-increasing function of wi for all i, then the optimal
mechanism assigns the goods to the agents with the highest unconditional expected values
E[vi]. That is, no information about the willingness to pay is extracted by the designer.
No one needs to make a payment to the designer. If agents are heterogeneous the optimal
mechanism is a priority list, where agents are ranked only on the basis of their observable
characteristics. If agents are all alike, all goods are assigned through an equal chance
lottery. In order to implement the outcome of these mechanisms the designer needs to
ban resale of the goods.
In the next proposition I show that extracting some information on the willingness
to pay is always benecial to the designer in the case where agents are symmetric and
the set Xi is the Cartesian product of two intervals: [vi;vi] and [ri;ri]. In particular, I
23The same reasoning applies to the optimal auction problem: banning resale is not necessary if,
whenever the good is allocated, it is allocated eciently (see Myerson (1981) or Riley and Samuelson
(1981)).
13show that E[vijwi] cannot be non-increasing if it is dened, regardless of the correlation
between vi and ri.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Xi = [vi;vi]  [ri;ri] for each i. Then, E[vjw] is not




1+ri] for any density function fvi;ri(;) which is strictly positive
in Xi and zero elsewhere.





E[vijwi = x] > E[vijwi = x0]. First, take x0 =
vi+vi
2(1+ri). The support for fvijwi(vijwi = x0) is
a subset of the interval [vl;
vi+vi
2 ]. Next, take x >
vi+vi
2(1+ri). The support for fvijwi(vijwi = x)
is a subset of (
vi+vi
2(1+ri);vi]. Therefore, because the supports do not overlap, we have that
E[vijwi = x] > E[vijwi = x0].
While the above result holds when Xi is a Cartesian product between two intervals,
in general, however, the function E[vijwi] can also be decreasing in the entire interval
where it is dened. This is illustrated by the following example, where high valuations
are correlated to high interest rates.
Example 1. Let Xi  <2
+ be the triangle dened by 1 
vi
1+ri  2 and 1+ri  3
2vi 2 (see
Figure 3). Furthermore, let fvi;ri = 1 be Xi and zero elsewhere. After some computations
I have that:
E[vi j wi] =
16   64wi + 76w2
i
12   48wi + 45w2
i
This function is strictly decreasing for 1  wi  2. Therefore, if all agents' values are
drawn from Xi according to fvi;ri(;), then the optimal mechanism is a lottery. No
information about the willingness to pay can be exploited.24
In general, the optimal mechanism may be a combination of market and non-market
mechanisms. The following mechanisms are all possible outcomes depending on the dis-
tributions of prior information. For example:
 Allocating the goods to all the members of a group A and selling the remaining
goods to the highest bidders in the second group B (e.g. if the minimum value for
an agent in group A is above the maximum for an agent in group B and E(vi j wi)
is increasing for agents in B).
24Note that if the designer could extract information about the willingness to pay she would want to
allocate the goods to those with the lowest willingness to pay. This is the reason why no information
extraction is the best incentive compatible outcome.
14Figure 3: Type Space in Example 1
 Allocating the goods to the highest bidder up to a maximum bid, after which ev-
eryone has the same probability of obtaining one good (e.g. if agents are symmetric
and E(vi j wi) is rst increasing and then decreasing).
 Allocating the goods to the highest bidders, for bids above a certain threshold, but
randomizing the (possibly) remaining goods among those that did not bid above
the threshold (e.g. if agents are symmetric and E(vi j wi) is rst decreasing and
then increasing).
Proposition 3 shows how to construct an optimal mechanism using as inputs the
15functions E[vijwi] for i = 1;:::;n. It is interesting to try to characterize E[vijwi] in terms
of the primitive model, that is the joint density of vi and ri. However, it appears that
the behaviour of E[vi j wi] is dicult to characterize a priori. The next example shows
that even in the case where vi and ri are independently distributed E[vijwi] can be non
monotonic.
Example 2. Assume that v and r are independently distributed and consider two cases:
(i) fv(v) = 1 for v 2 [0;1] and zero otherwise, and fr(r) = 1 for r 2 [0;1] and zero
otherwise; (ii) fv(v) = 1 for v 2 [0;1] and zero otherwise, and fr(r) = 1=2 for 0  r  1
2,
fr(r) = 3=2 for 1=2 < r  1 and zero otherwise. It can be shown that in case (i) E[vijwi]
is increasing and then constant. Therefore, if agents are symmetric a market mechanism
is optimal in this case. However, in case (ii) E[vijwi] is rst increasing, then decreasing,
and then increasing again. Therefore, in this second case, a hybrid mechanism (combining
features of both market and non-market mechanisms) may be optimal.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, I study a model for the allocation of scarce resources, where agents are
heterogeneous in terms of both their value for the goods and their opportunity costs for
money. Both variables are the private information of the agents. The designer would like
to maximize total value, but she can only extract information about the willingness to
pay, which is a noisy signal of value.
The solution to the outlined multidimensional mechanism design problem provides two
main insights. First in contrast to models where willingness to pay and value coincide,
an ex-post unconstrained optimal outcome cannot be achieved generically. Second, both
market and non-market allocations can be optimal, depending on the joint distribution of
prior information. That is, lotteries, priority lists and other hybrid mechanisms dominate
pure market mechanisms in cases where high values are positively correlated to high
opportunity costs for money.
I brie
y discuss the implications of my results in the context of two examples: al-
location of school places and allocation of scarce medical resources. However, there is
another application that is worthy of mention: the design of an ecient auction for the
allocation of licences to operate in a regulated market (e.g. mobile telecommunications).
In fact, due to capital market imperfections, rms may have dierent expected operating
16prots from obtaining a licence and also dierent opportunity costs for their investments.
For example, the costs of capital may be lower for large rms than smaller ones, but the
latter may be more ecient. My analysis shows that if the regulator has reason to believe
that this is the case, a non-market allocation may dominate an auction on the grounds
of maximizing social welfare (i.e. assuming that expected operating prots re
ect social
welfare more than overall prots).25
Concluding, an important topic for further research would be to a model that incorpo-
rates time preferences with heterogeneous opportunity costs for money. This would allow
the evaluation, within the same framework, of queues (and tournaments, as in Fernandez
and Gali (1999)) as resource allocation methods.26
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5 Appendix A
Proposition 5. Assume that interest rates are known. For each w, the set of agents
is partitioned in a chain of ordered sets, M1(w);M2(w);::: according to their values as




i 2 N n
[
zx




Dene Ij(w) as the set of agents with the highest priority levels, up to those included
in Mj(w):




Let jXj denote the cardinality of an arbitrary set X. Pick the highest natural number
s such that jIs(w)j  k. Call m = k   jIs(w)j, and r = jMs+1(w)j.
An incentive compatible symmetric 27 direct allocation mechanism hp;mi maximizes




> > > <
> > > :
1 if i 2 Is(w)
m=r if i 2 Ms+1(w)
0 otherwise




Proof. The allocation rule clearly maximizes (7) because it puts full weight on highest
value agents. The allocation rule is feasible because
Pn
i=1 pi(w) = k for each w 2 W.
Participation constraint are satised because: Ui(w) =
R wi
0 Pi(x)dx  0. The mechanism
runs no decit as mi(w)  0. Given that the payment rule satisfy (6), in order to show
that the mechanism is incentive compatible, we need to show that Pi(wi) is increasing.
As the willingness to pay are uncorrelated, this is an immediate consequence of the fact
that for each w i, pi(w) is increasing in wi.
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27I restrict attention to symmetric mechanisms. This is without loss of generality here because consid-
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Now, dene fv;w(;) as the joint density between v and w. We have:

































P(w)vfvjw(v j w)z(w)dvdw =
= Ew [P(w)E[v j w]]






















I use the ironing technique as developed in Myerson (1981). First, I will recall the deni-
tions in the text:





 1(y)]dy Gi(x) = convhHi(x)i gi(x) = G
0
i(x)
Here, convhi stands for the convex hull of the function.28 Where the derivative of
Gi(v) is not dened, we extend it using the right or left derivative. We dene the priority
function i for agent i as:
i(wi) = gi(Zi(wi))
Proposition 6. For each w, the set of agents is partitioned in a chain of ordered sets,
M1(w);M2(w);::: according to their priority levels. Formally, set M0(w)  ; and dene
Mx(w) recursively as follows:
Mx+1(w) 
(
i 2 N n
[
zx




Dene Ij(w) as the set of agents with the highest priority levels, up to those included
in Mj(w):




Let jXj denote the cardinality of an arbitrary set X. Pick the highest natural number
s such that jIs(w)j  k. Call m = k   jIs(w)j, and r = jMs+1(w)j.
An incentive compatible symmetric 29 direct allocation mechanism hp;mi maximizes




> > > <
> > > :
1 if i 2 Is(w)
m=r if i 2 Ms+1(w)
0 otherwise
28Gi(x) is the highest convex function such that Gi(x)  Hi(x) 8x.
29I restrict attention to symmetric mechanisms. This is without loss of generality here because consid-
ering asymmetric mechanisms will not improve on the symmetric solution obtained.
22The payment rule can be any set of functions m such that for all i and w 2 IR satises
(6). In particular, the mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible if:
















pi(w)  k 8w 2 IR
n
Pi(w)  Pi(w
) 8i 2 N; 8w;w
 2 IR : v  v

It can readily be seen that the candidate solution satises the rst constraint above,
and that m satises (6). To prove that (5) is also satised, note that i(v) is the derivative
of a convex function and therefore it is monotonically increasing. Then, 8w i p(w) is
increasing in wi, which implies that Pi() is also increasing.




Ewi fPi(wi)i(wi) + Pi(wi)[E[vi j wi]   i(wi)]g
Consider the second term of this expression for every i:
Z ui
0
Pi(wi)[E[vi j wi]   gi(Zi(wi))]z(wi)dvi
Integrating by parts:





[Hi(Zi(wi))   Gi(Zi(wi))]dPi(wi)) (11)
Consider the rst term of (9). It is equal to zero: Hi(0) = Gi(0) and Hi(1) = Gi(1),
because Gi is the convex hull of the continuous function Hi and thus they coincide at
23endpoints (the continuity of Hi follows from assuming an atomless Zi). To summarize,









It is easy to see that the candidate solution hp;ci maximizes the rst sum as it puts
all the probability on the players for whom i(wi) is maximal. To conclude the proof,
we can show that the second term is equal to zero. It must always be non negative, as
8wi Hi  Gi. That it is equal to zero, follows because Gi is the convex hull of Hi and
so, whenever Hi(Zi(wi)) > Gi(Zi(wi)), then Gi must be linear. That is, if G(x) < H(x),
G00
i(x) = g0
i(x) = 0. Therefore, to conclude, i(wi) will be a constant in a neighborhood
of wi, which implies that Pi(wi) will also be a constant.
24